Consols in a Great War by Giffen, Robert
 
Consols in a Great War
Author(s): Robert Giffen
Source: The Economic Journal, Vol. 9, No. 35 (Sep., 1899), pp. 353-364
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Royal Economic Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2957057
Accessed: 27-06-2016 08:12 UTC
 
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms
 
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted
digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Wiley, Royal Economic Society are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
The Economic Journal
This content downloaded from 128.42.202.150 on Mon, 27 Jun 2016 08:12:27 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL
 SEPTEMBER, 1899
 CONSOLS IN A GREAT WAR.'
 How far is the present price of Consols due to
 special and transitory causes, irrespective of the
 Government credit, and at what price could a large
 amount of the stock be issued if a great emergency
 should arise ?
 A QUESTION like what is here proposed is obviously rather a
 speculative one. No one can tell beforehand what the circum-
 stances of a great emergency, in which new borrowing by the
 English Government may become necessary, will be. We can
 conceive of a possibility such as the sudden outbreak of war with
 a great military power and the defeat of the English fleet by such
 power. In the case of such an emergenicy there will perhaps be
 no price or regular market for securities at all. We have also to
 consider that the general level of the rates of interest changes
 from time to tinle; and possibly in the next few years the general
 level for first-class securities, instead of being at a point for 2'
 per cent. stocks between 90 and 100, exclusive of Consols
 themselves, which are about 110, might be such that the general
 level of even 3 per cent. stocks would be under what 21's now
 are. It is conceived, however, that the discussion of a question
 like the above can proceed upon two assumptions-the first, that
 there is a great emergency, but stopping short of a great calamity
 and disaster such as one that would threaten the very existence
 of the British Empire itself; and second, that the rate of interest
 1 This paper was prepared for the purpose of a discussion on the question stated
 early in June. Prices have changed a little since then, not only for Consols but for
 other securities. But it appears best to leave all figures as they stand, and not to
 attempt bringing the paper up to date.-R. G.
 No. 35.-VOL IX. A A
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 before the emergency comes about has not changed from the
 present level, apart from the usual oscillations between times of
 good and bad credit. Such a discussion mnay bring up interesting
 points as to the conditions of national credit, and the use of a
 sinking fund for the redemption of debt, or for the provision in
 some. other way of a reserve against emergencies, by a Govern-
 ment in the position of that of the United Kingdom.
 The high price of Consols at the present time naturally
 suggests that in time of stress the rate at which new loans could
 be raised would be correspondingly high. The rate would be less
 of course than the present, because any new issue tends to lower
 the price for the time of existing issues, and still more a new
 issue in circumstances like those suggested, but the rate would
 still be high. It is the assumption that the rate would be
 correspondingly high, which I propose to dispute. On the con-
 trary, the market for Consols for some years has been an artificial
 one. When it becomes a natural market again, as it must do
 when large new issues take place, and when practically a new
 market would have to be found, the price would be considerably
 lower than it is now.
 Passing over for the moment the fact of the artificial character
 of the market for Consols at the present time, there are plenty of
 precedents to show that if the market were natural the price will
 probably not fall very much at first in the circumstances de-
 scribed. In the Franco-German war in 1870 the drop in French
 3 per cents. on the declaration of war was from 73 to 66. A fort-
 night before the declaration of war in this case everything was
 peaceful, and there was no sign whatsoever of any such outbreak
 being at hand. Consequently, the price after the declaration of war
 and the price a fortnight before measure the difference caused by the
 war itself, and by the apprehensions immediately excited as to what
 new issues would be. The event was not discounted beforehand.
 This difference, then, was from 73 to 66, or about 10 per cent.
 In the case of Germany the fall in Government stocks was even
 greater; but that is hardly a good precedent, on account of the
 small amount of the stocks themselves, and the absence of a
 first-class market for securities at that time in Germany. The
 fall in other stocks at the same time, especially the fall in the
 weaker foreign stocks, such as Italian, was much greater than
 what has been stated, partly owing to the suddenness of the panic
 which broke out on the Paris Bourse and on the London Stock
 Exchange; but in such emergencies, for obvious reasons, the
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 change in the value of Stock Exchange securities may be greatest,
 not in the securities of the Governments themselves who are
 directly concerned, but in those securities in which at the time
 there happens to be most speculation and which happen to be
 weakly held. In the first-class securities of the Governments
 themselves, the change is much less, and the case of what
 happened in France when the war of 1870 broke out is accord-
 ingly very much to the point. Similarly at the time of the
 Penj deh incident, when there was great apprehension of an
 immediate war between this country and Russia, the drop in
 Consols in one day was about five points, or more than 5 per cent.
 At the time of the recent Fashoda incident, threatening as matters
 looked for a few days, the drop in Consols was even less, and was
 very quickly recovered.
 There is no reason in substance, if we think of the matter,
 why the fall in such a case should be very great, assuming all the
 present prices to be natural prices. Apart from panic the ap-
 pearance of great States as borrowers for a few hundred millions
 is not calculated really to disturb the markets very much, as these
 issues to a large extent would do no more than absorb new
 savings which now go into all sorts of other new issues. I should
 say, however, that in the event of an actual outbreak of war
 between this country and one or two great powers such as France,
 Germany, and Russia, the commotion at first would probably be
 somewhat greater than anything that was indicated even by what
 happened in France at the time of the Franco-German war. At
 that time all the markets were steadied by the neutrality of
 England, in which lay far and away the biggest market for
 securities at the time. A war in which England would itself be
 engaged would be one in which the same equanimity could not
 prevail in the general markets for securities, because it is the
 country of the chief market which would be concerned.
 I should be inclined to assume, then, following the precedent
 of 1870, that the outbreak of a great war in which England itself
 would be engaged, would depress the price of first-class securities
 even more than the 10 per cent. which was the measure of the
 difference to France at the beginnin-g of its war with Germany.
 The difference perhaps would be not less than about 15 per cent.
 In support of the latter view it may be pointed out that as the
 war between France and Germany progressed, and indicated a
 greater danger for France than had been at first anticipated, the
 3 per cents. quickly fell to the price of 53, which was the price
 just after Sedan and the beginning of the Siege of Paris. Just
 A A 2
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 for the reason that -there would be no outside market to support
 prices, such as there was in England in 1870 when the Franco-
 German War broke out, any great calamity happening to England
 must have a greater effect on the market for English stocks than
 the calamities which happened to France in 1870 had upon
 French stocks.
 On the outbreak of war, then, between England and other
 countries, there is fair reason to expect in this view that the price
 of first-class securities all round would fall something like 15 per
 cent.; and my special contention now is that in English Govern-
 ment securities in particular, owing to the market at the present
 time being artificial, the fall Would probably be greater. The
 artificial premium in fact would disappear, and then the English
 Government securities would share in the general fall which the
 outbreak of war occasions.
 Before showing in detail the reasons for thinking that at
 present the price of English Government securities is artificial,
 it will be expedient to discuss generally what are the conditions
 of a natural market for securities of the best kind; that is, a first-
 rate market.
 These conditions appear to be as follows: (1) There must
 be a large quantity of the security itself; the security, in fact,
 must be large enough for many people to be interested in it, and
 for large dealings to take place. (2) There must also be a large
 quantity of the security relatively to the general business of the
 market. It is a help to such a security if it is the leading security
 in the market, because in that character it attracts a great deal of
 speculative interest, and speculative dealings take place accord-
 ingly in that security almost to the exclusion of others. It was
 noticed at the time when English Government securities were
 divided into two large classes, one Consols and the other New
 and Reduced, that although these two stocks were identical in
 every respect in their conditions, yet the fact of the speculative
 dealings being in Consols permanently raised the price about a
 half to 1 per cent. above that of the New and Reduced stock,
 which was identical in every respect except that of being called
 by the same name. (3) There must be a large quantity of the
 security in the hands of dealers and other holders about the
 market who study the security and are always ready to buy and
 sell. This last condition almost follows of necessity from the
 other two; in the case of the leading security in any market, it
 could not be leading unless a considerable amount of it was held
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 from time to time by dealers, both those persons known as dealers
 in the market itself and others who are about the market, and
 are technically not known as dealers, but who are, in fact, fre-
 quently ready to buy and to sell. It is necessary, however, to
 state the point separately when large masses of securities have
 come to be in existence without any speculative dealing taking
 place in them. It may be possible to use the average prices of
 such securities from time to time to show the general level of
 interest which prevails; but experience has shown that no such
 average, however ascertained, can be taken as a real test of
 market price in the same way that the price of a security fulfilling
 all the conditions above stated can be taken. In the latter case
 the market price is a safe guide; in no other case can it be taken
 as a complete guide, especially as regards any particular stock,
 when a considerable change is about to occur in the quantity of
 the stock itself or in the general conditions of the market.
 Without such a guide, an enormous addition to the supply of any
 stock implies, in fact, the making of a new market, for which
 new customers and operators have to be found.
 Formerly, and until quite recent years, the above were
 especially the conditions of the market for Consols. English
 Government securities in the early years of the century were of
 very great amount-C900,000,000 sterling after the close of the
 great war in 1815. They were also almost the whole market for
 securities at the time, occupying, at any rate, not merely a pre-
 eminent but a predominant position. The funds were then some-
 thing sui generis, spoken of in contrast with land, houses, and
 other investments not on the Stock Exchange. Even a quarter
 of a century ago Consols still occupied a leading place. The debt
 was then still ?800,000,000, and the funded debt alone about
 ?740,000,000. No doubt even then Consols were beginning to be
 thrust aside by other great markets,-the English railway market,
 the market for American Government and other securities, the
 market for various foreign loans (Turkish, Egyptian, Italian,
 Russian, and others, including for a time French Government
 securities), and other miscellaneous markets gradually growing in
 importance. Still, Consols occupied a pre-eminent if not a pre-
 dominant position, and they were the leading market. They still
 complied with all the conditions of a first-class market.
 But in the last quarter of a century, and especially within the
 last few years, the position has been entirely changed.
 1. The Debt is still large, being now about ?630,000,000, or
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 ?670,000,000 if we include a stock which has been separated,
 called the Local Loans Stock; but the debts of other Govern-
 ments have come to exceed or to approach the English amount.
 The Government Debt of France, for iinstance, is ?1,100,000,000,
 a sum greatly in excess of the present English Debt. Then we
 have an Austro-Hungarian Debt of nearly ?600,000,000; Italian,
 ?520,000,000; Russian, ?700,000,000; while there are Debts of
 ?100,000,00) and ?200,000,000 owing by quite a number of States,
 for the most part incurred in comparatively recent years. The
 English Debt accordingly does not hold the place it did in the
 general markets for securities, and the amount of foreign issues
 quoted on the London Stock Exchange alone amounits to about
 ?2,000,000,000.
 2. The proportion of the Debt itself to the total securities
 dealt in has enormnously diminished, partly, as has been seen,
 by the redemption of the Debt, though this redemption, while
 important with reference to the amount of the Debt, does not
 seem to be of importance as compared with the growth of other
 securities, which is the main cause of the change in proportion
 between the English Debt and those other securities. This
 change in proportion has already been indicated by the facts
 stated as to foreign Government Debts and issues. But a fuller
 statement may be useful. Whereas sixty or seventy years ago the
 English Debt amounted to about one-third or one-fourth of the
 whole capital of the community, it is now perhaps no more than
 one-twentieth. Whereas formerly it was almost the sole Stock
 Exchange security, it is now less than one-tenth of the securities
 quoted on the London Stock Exchange alone. The exact figure
 of such stocks quoted in the official list of the London Stock
 Exchange at 31st December, 1898, is stated to be ?7,609,000,000,
 of which, as already mentioned, about ;?2,000,000,000 are foreign
 Government issues. In addition, the markets for securities all
 over the world (in the United States, in Germany, in France, in
 Austria, in Italy, in Russia, and in our Australian Colonies and
 South Africa) have increased in even greater proportion; and as.
 they all form practically one market, the relative importance of
 Consols has greatly diminished. Many securities are dealt in in
 more markets than one, especially Government securities; but
 making all deductions for such double entries, one can hardly be
 wrong in estimating that the figure above stated for issues dealt.
 in on the London Stock Exchange would at least have to be
 doubled if we were to include the issues upon all the different,
 nmarkets throug,hout the world. Of this vast mass, English
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 Government securities are clearly a very small percentage
 indeed.
 3. While the mass of the English Government Debt with
 reference to other securities has thus been diminishing, it is also
 to be noticed that the amount in the hands of the public has
 diminished even more than the amount of the Debt itself, and this
 diminution has been very marked in recent years. This is chiefly
 the consequence of the investment of savings bank money in
 Government stocks. The total amount of such savings bank
 money is now about ?180,000,000, all of which must be invested
 in the English Government Debt, while other amounts of stock
 are held by other departments of the Government. It would seem
 that admitting the amount of the English Government Debt to
 be ?630,000,000, or ?670,000,000 including the Local Loans
 Stock, nearly the whole of it in excess of ?400,000,000 is held by
 the National Debt Commissioners for the savings banks or by
 other Government departments. The small amount which can
 be dealt in is shown in another way. The amount of the leading
 stock, Consols, actually quoted in the Stock Exchange official
 list is ?522,000,000; and if we allow that some part of this amount
 is held by the savings banks and other Government departments,
 though their holdings, of course, are not exclusively in Consols,
 we can easily see that the amount of Consols themselves in the
 hands of the public is probably not much more than ?400,000,000.1
 When it is considered, moreover, that the greater part of this
 sum is locked up, being held by trustees and other holders who
 are not in a position to sell, or by banks who are not so limited,
 but who prefer for various reasons to invest in Consols or keep a
 portion of the reserve in Consols, and who inever sell, it can be
 quite well understood that the amount of the stock available for
 actual market purposes is so small as to take from it not merely
 the predominance but the pre-eminence it once had among
 securities dealt in on the Stock Exchange.
 4. What is equally undoubted is that the stock in the hands
 of dealers, technically or practically so, has so greatly diminished
 that now the markets for Consols cannot properly be called a
 great leading market at all. There is no longer a class of large
 holders interested in the security constantly ready to buy and sell,
 and consequently in Consols there is no ionger that sort of market
 which has been described above as a free and natural first-rate
 market on the Stock Exchange. I am assured that as a matter
 1 This is quite confirmed by the last returns as to the holding of Government
 securities by the different departments of the Government.
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 of fact the number of capitalists constituting the Consol market,
 and able to engage in large business, has conspicuously diminished
 in the last twenty years, till now it is quite obvious that the
 market is insignificant, to a degree, compared with other markets
 on the Stock Exchange.
 5. Theincrease of savings bankmoneyhastakenplaceverylargely
 since 1895, when the annual addition to the deposits in the savings
 banks from being about ?4,000,000 to ?5,000,000 suddenly went
 up to over ?10,000,000. And this change is coincident with
 a change in the relative prices of Consols and the leading deben-
 ture stocks of railways, apparently indicating that Consols during
 the last two or three years have been subject to especial influences.
 A few years ago the 3 per cent. Debenture Stock of the London
 and North-Western Railway stood at 124, while Consols were at
 114. Now the 3 per cent. Debenture Stocks of the London and
 North-Western Railway are at 111, showing a loss of 13 points,
 while Consols are about 110, showing a loss of four points only.
 Consols have thus been sustained by a cause not applicable to
 first-rate securities generally, and the explanation, no doubt,
 is the application of the savings bank money to investment in
 Consols.
 As the whole result, we may say that Consols during the last
 quarter of a century, and especially during the last few years,
 have lost the characteristics of a first-rate market for securities.
 They are of less amount in themselves than they were; for
 various reasons.the whole amount is not upon the market at all;
 and now the market is so small that there is no free dealinlg in
 them, such as is necessary for a first-class market. There is, in
 fact, what one may call a corner in Consols, and as in all corners,
 the present price is not a real indicationl of what the market
 would be when natural conditions are restored.
 In the circumstances we may expect, then, that if there are
 large new issues, this will so alter the general condition of Consols
 that the premium due to what we may call the present corner
 must disappear. That premium would seem to be from 5 to 10
 per cent. in amount, which may be considered an extra premium
 not indicating any special credit which the English Government
 has, but merely the special conditions which have made Consols
 scarce; when the stocks become abundant again all this premium
 will disappear, and the price of large new issues will be
 determined by the circumstanices of the issue and the general
 state of credit. The English Government will still hold a
This content downloaded from 128.42.202.150 on Mon, 27 Jun 2016 08:12:27 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 CONSOLS IN A GREAT WAR 361
 premier position, but it would not be more than a shade better
 than other first-class borrowers. In the event of a first-class
 war, in fact, English Government securities stand to lose not
 merely the 15 per cent. which is likely to occur in all first-class
 securities, but the extra premium of 5 or 10 per cent. which has
 come about in consequence of the corner in Consols.
 This being the position, what may be considered, apart from
 Consols, the general level of credit at the present time ? I have to
 submit the following short table, showing the prices of the leading
 first-class securities:
 Price.
 French 3 per cents ................... , 101
 German ,, . 90
 United States 4 per cents ................... 130, equal to 3 per cent.
 at 98
 Russian ,, 100, equal to 3 per cent.
 at 75
 New South Wales 3 per cents ...................... 101
 Indian Government 21 per cents. (gold) ............... 94
 Canadian 2i per cents . .................................... 91
 M etropolitan ,, ...... ............................. 97
 London County Council 21 per cents ................... 95
 London and North-Western Railway 3 per cent.
 Debenture Stock ....................................... 111, equal to 21 per cent.
 at 922
 Great Western 21 per cent. Debenture Stock ...... 92
 From these figures we may consider that the general level of
 credit at the present time is represented by the price of the best
 21 per cent. Railway Debenture Stocks, viz., 92, or, at most, some-
 thing intermediate between that and the -21 per cent. stocks of
 the London County Council, or of the Indian Government, viz.,
 94 or 95. An easy calculation would thus show that the probable
 price of the best new issues at 21 per cent. in the event of a great
 war, allowing for a 15 per cent. fall, will be something a little
 over 80; or, say, 85 ; the corresponding price of the 3 per cent.
 issue would be over par, but there would, of course, be special
 difficulties in connection with an issue of stock over par. These
 would also be about the prices, I believe, at which the English
 Government could borrow, assuming that the present extra
 premium on Consols due to artificial causes is 5 or 10 per
 cent. A reduction of 10 per cent. from the present price of
 Consols would bring them down to about par, and from that a fall
 of 15 per cent. would give the price of 85. A good deal will, of
 course, depend upon the exact amount of the present artificial
 premium on Consols. But whatever we take it to be, somie
 allowance must be made practically for the existence of such a
 premium when business comes to be done.
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 It is of little use quoting expert authority in such matters, for
 experts are not unlikely to differ; but a few weeks ago I happened
 to obtain the opinion of a gentleman, since deceased, who would
 be universally recognised in the City as one of the best authorities
 upon such a point. As it happened, he had also considered the
 matter very fully. His opinion was that in the event of a great
 war and of large issues of Consols by the English Government at
 21 per cent., the price would probably be about 80, and the price
 for 3 per cents would be a little over 90. Other authorities seem
 inclined to think that the prices in the case supposed would be
 higher than these; but I do not know of any authority who was
 quite so well qualified as the friend to whom I have referred,
 or who had so fully entered into all the pros and cons of the
 subject.
 Of course, these calculations do not carry us beyond the actual
 beginning of a war and the beginning of large issues consequent
 upon it. What would happen as the indirect result of all the
 commotion and excitement attendant upon a war, and the great
 efforts which might have to be made to carry it on, is a little
 beyond even the slight prevision which may be considered possible
 on the assumption with which we started. The great point is
 that we must not assume too hastily that there is not going to be
 a great fall in Consols, quite disproportionate to what there may
 be in other first-class securities.
 I might stop at this point, having answered the question put;
 but there is a practical issue on which the facts stated appear to
 have some bearing, viz., the question of the use of a sinking fund
 for the redemption of debt or for the accumulation of a reserve
 against emergencies by a Government like our own. The bearing
 of the facts stated seems to be that the credit of the Government
 for purposes of business is not improved by the redemption of the
 debt or by the accumulation of a reserve fund against emergencies,
 because its credit is already of the highest possible quality, and
 its borrowing power will be regulated accordingly by the general
 conditions of credit, and not by the increase or decrease of the
 debt by a few millions annually. The Government is one of
 many first-class borrowers, and a little redemption of its own
 debt does not seem to matter as far as its credit is concerned, one
 way or the other. This may seem a hard saying; but when we
 perceive the credit of a country like Russia increasing from year
 to year, notwithstanding increasing debt, and the credit of a
 country like France increasing the same way, we have surely
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 cause to doubt what precise part is played by the redemption of
 debt on our own credit. Formerly this debt redemption was
 undoubtedly an important factor. When our debt was so large
 as to amount to one-third of the property in the country, and
 when it was also alinost the sole Stock Exchange security, its
 redemption of course affected credit generally. But now, in
 comparison with the great forces in the market, the redemption
 does not seem specially important to the security upon which it
 is exercised. The redemption is, in fact, for the benefit of all
 high-class stocks, not specially for the benefit of English Govern-
 ment stocks; and upon this large mass it does not seem to exercise
 a very great influence.
 The gain to us, therefore, from the reduction of debt must
 apparently be limited to the direct gain; the indirect gain from
 the effect upon credit generally, or from the effect upon the special
 credit of the Government not being material. As regards this
 direct gain, assuming all the payment made for the redemption
 of debt to be an additional saving of the community which would
 not otherwise be made, then the country gains about ?25,000
 annually for every million applied to the payment of debt. The
 applicationi of a hundred millions would accordingly save to the
 country annually ?2,500,000, which is hardly a perceptible item
 in the aggregate income of the country. It is about equal to the
 annual present which sugar bounty countries are alleged to give
 to our sugar consumers by means of the bounty.
 But if the payment is not an additional saving at all, but a
 transfer from one holder to another, as appears to be the case while
 so much of the income of the Government is derived from taxes on
 capital, the question may well arise whether the redemption of
 debt in present conditions is of any use to the State. The direct
 gain in the last case is absolutely nil. What the Government
 gains, the community as a whole loses; and so the resources of
 the State are actually unchanged by the process.
 The general effect of this argument is accordingly to show
 that there is no necessity at the present time for our reducing
 debt or for accumulating a reserve against emergencies. We
 seem to gain nothing by the process, because it is one which is
 not required for its effect upon credit, and the direct gain is quite
 inappreciable; and it is perhaps doubtful, looking to the nature of
 our taxation, whether there is any direct gain at all. My own
 opiniorn is that it would now be the wisest thing for us to give
 up any attempt at the reduction of debt, so long at least as the
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 means for paying the debt are really derived from taxes on
 capital.
 I do not, however, put forward the present argument as fully
 covering the whole question. All that is here claimed is that the
 usual arguments for the reduction of debt are not what they are
 supposed to be, and that the whole question requires a great deal
 of reconsideration. I hope to return to this subject on an early
 occasion.
 ROBERT GIFFEN.
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